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Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to
support subjects in the completion of cognitively effortful tasks, especially those
involving executive functions (EF). In this paper we focus on two populations who
notoriously encounter difficulties in performing EF tasks, namely, people diagnosed with
schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-AVH) and people with
autism spectrum conditions (ASC). We focus on these two populations because they
represent two different ways in which IS can fail to help in EF tasks, which can be
illustrative for other mental conditions. First, we review the main components of EF (see
section “Executive Functions”). Then we explain the functions that IS is taken to perform
in the domain of EF (see section “Inner Speech and Executive Functions”) and review the
evidence concerning problems about EF in the two populations of our study: Sz-AVH
(see section “Executive Functions and Inner Speech in Sz-AVH”) and ASC (see section
“Executive Function and Inner Speech in ASC”). After this we further detail our account
about what a properly functioning IS can do for both populations and how different
IS profiles may impact EF performance: in the case of Sz-AVH, the uncontrolled and
intrusive character of IS negatively affects EF performance, whereas in ASC, EF is not
sufficiently supported by IS, given the tendency in this population to present a diminished
use of IS (see section “IS in ASC and Sz-AVH: How It Relates to EF”). We finally briefly
discuss Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Developmental Language
Disorders (DLD) (see section “Further Considerations”).
Keywords: inner speech, executive functions, autism spectrum conditions, schizophrenia, auditory verbal
hallucinations
INTRODUCTION
Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjects
in the completion of cognitive effortful tasks, especially those involving executive functions (EF)
(Vygotsky, 1987; Fernyhough, 1996, 2004; Winsler et al., 2009). This seems to be the case in the
majority of the neurotypical population, although the use of IS varies from subject to subject
(Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008). Recurring themes in very different questionnaires refer to the use
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of IS in tasks that require self-control or self-regulation, that is, in
processes involving EF. In fact, ever since Vygotsky (1987), many
authors have taken it that the main function of IS is related to EF:
young children, in a first developmental step, use overt self-talk
in tasks such as planning, inhibition, attention-focusing, etc., in
ways that mimic patterns of conversations with their caregivers.
In the next step, they internalize such self-talk without altering its
purpose. Empirical investigation also shows some support for the
idea that IS is involved in EF processes, from working memory
(Baddeley, 1992) to task-switching (Emerson and Miyake, 2003)
or planning (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015).
In this paper we focus on two populations who notoriously
encounter difficulties in completing EF tasks, namely, people with
autism spectrum conditions (ASC),1 and people diagnosed with
schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-
AVH). ASC and schizophrenia have already been compared to
one another with respect to shared clinical features such as
social withdrawal, communication impairments, or failure to
make eye contact (Dvir and Frazier, 2011). Here we aim to
compare these two populations along a new dimension, i.e.,
EF performance and the role that IS plays in it. By studying
these two different populations we also try to understand more
clearly what cognitive functions IS supports and what structure
it has to embody to perform them. Given the nature of the
IS profile and the EF issues that schizophrenia patients with
AVH encounter, it is pertinent that we focus on this subgroup.
With respect to ASC, we focus on studies investigating the
presence and use of IS in this population. In general, we
know about the functions that IS performs mostly through
experiments that use verbal interference (the so-called dual-
task studies, where the secondary task is specifically designed
to disrupt performance on the primary task). Yet, it is not
clear to what extent IS is a tool among others (e.g., it can be
easily substituted by visual imagery, or even by “unsymbolized
thinking”: Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011), or
whether it has some features that make it special. It is
also not clear whether gaining cognitive control depends on
IS simply being “present” (just talking to yourself) or on
it being present in a certain way (IS has to have certain
properties or take a certain form). By comparing ASC people
and people with Sz-AVH along the dimension of IS, we
suggest that these populations may represent two extreme
poles with respect to IS profiles. This might in turn help us
to understand other IS profiles in different conditions (i.e.,
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorder, depression or anxiety).
The plan for the paper is as follows. First, we review the
main components of EF to have a clear grasp of the cognitive
processes underlying them (see section “Executive Functions”).
Then we explain the functions that IS is taken to perform in
the domain of EF (see section “Inner Speech and Executive
Functions”) and review the evidence concerning problems about
1In line with the autism rights movement and neurodiversity movement more
generally, we use the label ‘Autistic Spectrum Conditions’ (ASC) instead of ‘Autistic
Spectrum Disorder’ (ASD) in this paper. However, we acknowledge that ASD is
still widely used as a diagnostic label (following the DSM-5 classification), and that
most of the studies discussed here employ this terminology.
EF in the two populations of our study: Sz-AVH (see section
“Executive Functions and Inner Speech in Sz-AVH”), and ASC
(see section “Executive Function and Inner Speech in ASC”).
After this we further detail our account about what a properly
functioning IS can do for both populations and how issues with IS
may impact EF performance (see section “IS in ASC and Sz-AVH:
How It Relates to EF”). More specifically, we suggest that people
with Sz-AVH and ASC fail to properly recruit IS in executive
tasks, although they do so in different ways. On the one hand,
people with Sz-AVH would have a hard time controlling and
channeling their IS toward the relevant task, to the extent that
their performance would be hindered by intrusions or distractors
coming from their own IS. On the other hand, typically, people
with ASC would rely less on IS when completing EF tasks, often
resulting in poorer performance. In relation with ASC, we finally
discuss Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and
Developmental Language Disorders (DLD) (see section “Further
Considerations”).
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
The notion of EF is often used within psychiatry and clinical
psychology as an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of
skills and abilities, such as working memory, updating, shifting,
inhibition, planning, problem-solving, or reasoning (see Miyake
et al., 2000; Diamond, 2013 for a review). There seems to be
some consensus that these skills and abilities form part of EF,
even though there is no agreement concerning how to precisely
characterize EF, except by relating it to other notions such as
self-regulation, self-management or control. These abilities are
routinely measured in experimental and clinical settings through
a number of tests and measures, e.g., the Tower of London test,
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), the Stroop test, etc.
However, experimental research on EF has been said to suffer
from the so-called “task impurity problem” (Snyder et al., 2015),
which appears when the administration of a certain task prompts
the use of several different cognitive processes within the whole
construct, thus leading to potentially conflated results regarding
specific EFs (e.g., a subject’s score on the WCST might depend
on the recruitment of task-switching, planning, and working
memory: Geurts et al., 2009).2
The different components of EF are related to different areas
in the brain (Vivanti et al., 2019) and may even belong to different
“systems” or ways of processing information (Friedman and
Sterling, 2019). Several researchers distinguish between core EF
and higher-order EF as follows:
o Core EF: working memory, updating, inhibitory control, task-
switching (Miyake et al., 2000; Lehto et al., 2003; Diamond, 2013;
Logue and Gould, 2014).
o Higher-order EF: planning, problem solving, reasoning, verbal
fluency (Collins and Koechlin, 2012; Lunt et al., 2012; Snyder et al.,
2015).
2The particular constructs underlying EF tend to be labeled differently by different
research groups, thereby enhancing terminological confusion (e.g., attentional
control, effortful control, self-regulation, self-monitoring; see Snyder et al., 2015).
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As it can be seen, these two groups of cognitive abilities are
obviously related to self-regulation or self-control, but they seem
to pertain to different cognitive realms. Core EF skills relate to
basic-level processes that arise relatively early in development
and are evolutionarily ancient. We briefly review them below.
Inhibition refers to the ability to suppress irrelevant,
interfering information and impulses, or contextually
inappropriate responses, including emotional reactions. In
fact, inhibition encompasses a range of processes as different
as selective attention, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
or motoric inhibition (Diamond, 2013). All the habitual
tasks designed to track this construct, such as Go/No-Go
tasks, the Stroop test, the Day/Night Task, or the Knock/Tap
task (Joseph et al., 2005), measure the ability to suppress
preponderant responses.
Working memory (WM) is the process through which
information is actively held in mind for very short periods
of time while performing a task (Baddeley, 1992). It also
involves monitoring, coding, and appropriately revising relevant
information, with the latter at times known as updating (Miyake
et al., 2000). Habitual measures of WM are the keep track task,
the tone monitoring task, and the letter memory task. The Corsi
Block test is also often used for this purpose, as it requires subjects
to keep a specific sequence in mind, i.e., to touch blocks in
the same order as shown by the experimenter. Let us note that
updating seems to be an independent skill: indeed, subjects or
systems could be good at keeping information ready for use as
well as at manipulating it, while at the same time being utterly
repetitive in their behavior.
Finally, task-switching is the ability to shift to different
thoughts or actions depending on situational demands (Geurts
et al., 2009). It may be characterized as the ability to disengage
from an irrelevant task and engage in a relevant one. Task-
switching is also often referred to as “cognitive flexibility” (CF),
which is usually construed as the opposite of rigidity. Issues
with flexibility result in perseveration errors or the repetition
of the same response despite varying stimulus (Miyake et al.,
2000). However, according to some, CF builds on WM and
inhibition as it requires us “to inhibit (or deactivate) our
previous perspective and load into WM (or activate) a different
perspective” (Diamond, 2013, p. 14). Flexibility thus construed
would therefore work as an umbrella term encompassing
Core EF, i.e., a combination of WM, inhibition, updating and
shifting. Common examples of CF measures are the Plus-
minus task, the Number-letter task (Miyake et al., 2000), the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, the Unusual Uses Task (UUT),
and the Intradimensional–Extradimensional Shift task (ID/ED)
(see Geurts et al., 2009). Notably, most of these tests involve all
the components of Core EF, i.e., WM, inhibition, updating, and
switching. Thus, ‘cognitive flexibility’ may simply be another label
for ‘Core EF’: to avoid confusion, in what follows we prefer to
limit our discussion to task-switching alone, without including
CF as a separate component of Core EF.
Higher-order executive functions (HO-EF), on the other
hand, relate to cognitive processes and abilities that arise later
in development, involve concepts, can be explicitly taught,
and appear in fewer species. Some authors link these abilities
to System-2 (i.e., conscious, serial, and effortful) processing
(Friedman and Sterling, 2019). HO-EF routinely include
reasoning and planning. Reasoning is a broad notion that applies
to a range of different processes such as problem solving and
decision making, as well as to seeing patterns or relations among
items, or figuring out abstract concepts underlying analogies
(Diamond, 2013). As such, it encompasses, although it does
not fully correspond to, the notion of “fluid intelligence.” Some
of the most common reasoning measures are Raven Matrices,
or averaging performance on a diverse battery of tasks (e.g.,
Hotel Task, Iowa Gambling Task, etc.) – see Roca et al. (2014).
Planning, in turn, involves choosing and implementing a strategy
in routine or new situations in which a sequence of actions
must be monitored, judged and updated in light of a pre-
specified goal (Hill, 2004; Ward and Morris, 2004). Habitual
measures of planning include the Tower of London, the Tower
of Hanoi, or Mazes.
As will become clearer in the remainder of the paper, the
distinction between Core EF, HO-EF, and their different sub-
components proves helpful in acquiring a better understanding
of populations who experience difficulties completing executive
tasks. We are interested in uncovering more specific ways to
characterize the challenges and successes that people with ASC
and Sz-AVH experience in the different domains of EF. For
instance, it makes a significant difference (both experimentally
and conceptually) to understand someone’s performance in an
EF task in terms of using resources differently, or inefficiently,
or failing to recruit them altogether. Focusing more specifically
on different EF components also allows us to offer a more precise
explanation of the difficulties encountered by ASC and Sz-AVH
populations, one that hinges on their use of IS. EF tasks appear
prominent within the research on mental and developmental
conditions, such as ASC and schizophrenia (see Snyder et al.,
2015 for a review). Although a number of studies reveal that
subjects affected by either of these conditions tend to perform
poorly in EF tasks (Russell et al., 1999; Ibanez-Casas et al., 2013;
Craig et al., 2016), the reasons behind these results are yet to be
fully understood.
INNER SPEECH AND EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONS
After James (1890), IS is usually characterized as “the little
voice in the head.” It can be seen as an action (subjects
perform speech acts with it) and as auditory imagery (if the
focus is on the experiential part). IS seems to result from
an aborted act of (overt) speech: subjects put a message into
words, using the syntax, semantics, and phonology of their
language but aborting the motor commands right after they
are issued (Lśvenbruck et al., 2018). IS is used for many
purposes, from avoiding boredom to reflecting about oneself,
but, since Vygotsky (1987), many authors take it that the most
fundamental function of IS is self-regulation (for a critical
review of this notion, see Langland-Hassan and Vicente, 2018).
Indeed, many have made the connection between EF and IS.
With respect to working memory, IS has been considered part
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of the phonological loop (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley,
1992), namely a system that, together with the visuospatial
sketchpad, supports the central executive in a number of activities
such as storing, manipulating, and coordinating information
(Mulvihill et al., 2020). Regarding inhibition, IS is said to be used
for self-control purposes as it enhances the ability to restrain
our impulses (see Tullett and Inzlicht, 2010 for a study with
adults), although it doesn’t appear as necessary for inhibiting
responses. Similarly, IS is not key to task switching habitual
tasks (e.g., in the WCST) but enhances performance in these
cases as well (see Zelazo, 2004; Cragg and Nation, 2010 for
evidence about children). In particular, it has been stressed
that IS is not directly responsible for the process of switching
between tasks but rather has a more circumscribed role. The
studies conducted by Emerson and Miyake (2003) with adults
underscore an important self-cueing function played by IS,
especially in circumstances where external cues are limited and
the subject has to rely on additional self-direction. Such self-
cueing would take the form of task-relevant sub-vocalizations,
such as “add,” “subtract,” etc. (p. 162). Notably, in these cases
IS seems to play a role in making some task-relevant mental
states conscious.
With respect to HO-EF like planning, IS is not a necessary tool
in experimental task performance, at least in adults (Alderson-
Day and Fernyhough, 2015), although it has a role again in
supporting it. Williams et al. (2012) used a dual task paradigm
and showed that neurotypicals performed worse without the aid
of IS in a Tower of London task. However, verbal interference did
not affect adults with ASC, as we will see, which apparently means
that IS may enhance planning performance only in those subjects
who regularly use IS for these and possibly other functions.
However, it must also be noted that although towers can be
planned verbally, they are fundamentally a visuospatial task,
so it is unclear whether using IS in other kinds of planning
may be actually enhancing performance or even necessary
across the board.
As for the last HO-EF, reasoning, IS does not appear necessary
for logical reasoning and problem solving either (Alderson-
Day and Fernyhough, 2015). Actually, some kinds of logical
reasoning are present even in prelinguistic children (Cesana-
Arlotti et al., 2018). However, both planning and reasoning
as typically conceived (i.e., as System-2 effortful, serial and
conscious processes), do routinely recruit IS, at least in the
neurotypical population. According to some authors, in fact, IS
is essential to conscious thinking in general (see Jackendoff, 1996;
Bermudez, 2003), and according to other researchers, forms of
reasoning involving abstract concepts might be highly facilitated
by the use of IS, given that representation of such concepts
involves inner articulation of the words associated with them
(Borghi et al., 2018).3
3Based on studies on the activation of the mouth motor system when learning
novel categories and real abstract words in adults, and developmental studies
on the interference produced by the use of pacifier in children, as well as
whether gum-chewing affects adults’ online processing of abstract concepts, Borghi
et al. (2018) hypothesize that IS contributes “either to the re-enactment of the
acquisition experience, or the re-explanation to oneself of its meaning and/or to
the information request on the conceptual meaning to others” (p. 6).
In general we can summarize the results of the empirical
research on the use of IS in EF tasks as being a core feature in
(verbal) WM, and mainly enhancing performance in inhibition
and task-switching, as well as in planning and reasoning.
However, the view that emerges is clearly constrained by the tasks
employed to measure the abilities in question.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND INNER
SPEECH IN Sz-AVH
Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous mental condition characterized
by a range of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional manifestations.
Its description within the DSM-5 distinguishes between
positive symptoms (e.g., delusions and hallucinations) and
negative symptoms (e.g., diminished emotional expression).
Auditory verbal hallucinations represent one of the hallmarks
of schizophrenia (Henriksen et al., 2015), although there is
evidence that these experiences are quite frequent in non-clinical
populations too (see Allen et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2014). AVH
are often characterized as “the most typical single symptom
in schizophrenia” (Wing et al., 1974; David, 1999), being
experienced by 60–80% of people diagnosed with such condition
(Sartorius et al., 1986), and they are considered a “marker” of a
psychotic episode (Hugdahl et al., 2009).4 Despite the complexity
surrounding AVH manifestations, in this paper we focus on
AVH within the context of schizophrenia (Sz-AVH), and on the
IS profile exhibited by this subgroup in relation with EF.
Before narrowing the focus to the Sz-AVH subgroup, we
review some evidence regarding EF issues in schizophrenia.
Common measures of inhibition and shifting, such as the Stroop
test and the WCST, reveal the difficulties that people with
schizophrenia exhibit with “changing attention from one aspect
of the stimulus to another” (Ibanez-Casas et al., 2013, p. 6).
Similarly, they appear to perform poorly in updating and in
planning tasks like the Tower of London (Grover et al., 2011).
The meta-analysis recently conducted by Snyder et al. (2015)
reveals that “the largest EF deficits are found for individuals with
schizophrenia, with large effect sizes on measures of shifting,
inhibition, updating, visuospatial WM, and verbal manipulation,
and a medium effect size for simple verbal WM maintenance”
(p. 10). Compromised cognitive functioning thus appears to be
a pervasive feature of schizophrenia, with 70–80% of patients
exhibiting cognitive deficits in the form of severe general
intellectual impairment and EF difficulties in planning, switching,
updating, and working memory (Reichenberg, 2010; see also
Wobrock et al., 2009).
Subjects affected by schizophrenia appear to fare particularly
poorly in tasks measuring inhibition, both in terms of response
(i.e., self-control and impulsive acting) and interference control
(i.e., cognitive inhibition; see Diamond, 2013 on this distinction).
4AVH additionally feature as a significant symptom of other psychiatric
disturbances such as bipolar disorder and major depression (see Toh et al., 2015
for a review). The sole experience of AVH under stressful circumstances, especially
when combined with a negative appraisal, has the potential of giving rise to
clinically relevant manifestations (Fernyhough, 2004).
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More evidence on this point comes from the so-called Jumping-
To-Conclusions tasks (JTC), where participants are asked to
rate the likelihood of a future event after observing only a few
instances. One common JTC measure is the so-called beads
task, in which participants are shown two jars containing beads
of different colors (e.g., pink and green): one jar will typically
have significantly more pink than green beads and the other
will have significantly more green than pink beads. The jars are
then hidden and participants are shown a sequence of beads
apparently being drawn from one of the two jars. After each
draw, participants are asked if they are ready to make a decision
about which jar the beads were being drawn from, or if they
would like to continue with the draw. Many studies report that
people with schizophrenia are prone to jumping to conclusions
on the basis of fewer elements, i.e., they make a decision about
which jar the beads are being drawn from on the basis of
significantly fewer beads than controls (Speechley et al., 2010;
Dudley et al., 2016).
A number of studies also connect executive impairment in
schizophrenia with the severity of positive symptoms such as
delusions and hallucinations (Guillem et al., 2008; Lesh et al.,
2011; Fioravanti et al., 2012). Particularly interesting in this
respect are the studies focusing on EF performance in Sz-AVH
subjects. A recent study that specifically compares controls and
Sz-AVH patients is the one conducted by Brébion et al. (2016). In
this experiment, participants completed a simple verbal memory
task involving free recall and recognition of lists of words
with different structures (i.e., high-frequency, low-frequency, and
semantically organizable words). The experimenters recorded
the number of words recalled as well as the number of extra-
list intrusions and false recognitions. Notably, both intrusions
and false recognitions were reliably associated with AVH,
and these mistakes did not seem dependent on the semantic
structure of words (p. 7). Another recent study conducted by
Toh et al. (2020) employs a battery of tasks to assess the
degree of EF disruption in three subgroups diagnosed with
schizophrenia: current voice-hearers, past voice-hearers, and
never voice-hearers. Notably, current voice-hearers were found
to be more impaired in the inhibition and visual learning domain
(i.e., visual organization tasks requiring elements of planning),
both with respect to controls and clinical subjects who had
not recently experienced AVH. The idea that Sz-AVH subjects
would exhibit specific issues with the inhibition of irrelevant
stimuli – as well as with WM – has also been supported
by studies employing the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant
Memories task (ICIM) – see Waters et al. (2003) and Paulik et al.
(2007). In these experiments participants are asked to identify
a number of target pictures over four rounds, while filtering
out potential distractors – i.e., target pictures that appeared
in previous rounds. The ability to inhibit previously relevant
items was found to be diminished both in Sz-AVH subjects
(Waters et al., 2003) and in non-clinical subjects predisposed
to hallucinations (Paulik et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2018).
Although more research is needed to corroborate these findings,
they support a possible connection between AVH severity and
poor EF performance. In particular, these results suggest that
Sz-AVH subjects – along with people at-risk of developing
hallucinations – may encounter specific EF difficulties involving
inhibition and WM.5
In the remainder of the section, we draw on this evidence
to substantiate our view on EF difficulties in the Sz-AVH
population. We begin by exploring the broader IS profile
exhibited by Sz-AVH subjects, we list some of its most disruptive
features and explain how EF problems may account for them.
Generally speaking, it is expected that Sz-AVH subjects will
often lack control over their IS because their self-monitoring
mechanisms, partially dependent on EF elements, may fail to
make the required adjustments to match outputs to desired goals.
Here we further detail this proposal by suggesting that many
IS episodes in Sz-AVH subjects would be characterized by an
uncontrolled/uncontrollable character. This broader feature might
in turn depend on more specific IS characteristics, such as:
• Overflowing and Distracting: Sz-AVH subjects may
experience more intrusions in IS, and this would negatively
affect their performance in verbal, inhibition, shifting,
and planning tasks. For instance, in the study conducted
by Alderson-Day et al. (2014), vulnerability to AVH
experiences correlates with the presence of other people
in IS (see also de Sousa et al., 2016; Rosen et al., 2018).
This characteristic may in turn be connected with a higher
degree of interference with task completion, as the presence
of other people in IS would arguably represent a major
distracting factor.
• Negative, Emotionally Relevant and Dystonic: The IS
episodes experienced by Sz-AVH subjects may be more
negative in content, or they may be appraised more
negatively (Fernyhough, 2004; Hugdahl et al., 2012). They
might also be harder to ignore due to their emotional
relevance (e.g., self-derogatory comments) or their dystonic
character (i.e., failure to align with the person’s self-
attributed thoughts and emotions) – see López-Silva (2016).
• Multiple, Fragmented: The IS episodes experienced by Sz-
AVH subjects are likely to be multiple (i.e., focusing on
different aspects of experience at the same time) fragmented
(i.e., distributed across more than one “voice,” not
temporally coordinated or synchronized), and externally
attributed (i.e., appraised as coming from an external source
as opposed to self-originated) – see Langland-Hassan
(2008). IS experiences characterized by fragmentation
would disrupt the acquisition of a stable viewpoint, as
different perspectives simultaneously coexist in the subject
(see Hurlburt, 2011 for a similar view on bulimia nervosa).
So far, we have presented some evidence of specific EF
difficulties in the Sz-AVH population and we have offered some
reasons to think that these subjects would exhibit an uncontrolled
IS profile. In what follows we suggest that these underlying EF
5More specific proposals on the aspects of inhibition involved in AVH have
been advanced by Paulik et al. (2008) and Alderson-Day et al. (2019). Both
groups propose intentional cognitive inhibition (i.e., the ability to willfully control
thoughts and memories) as the relevant mechanism in AVH development.
Although their proposal deserves further theoretical and empirical scrutiny, we
settle for a more general claim here, namely that Sz-AVH subjects exhibit EF
impairments in the inhibition and WM domains.
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issues impact IS in Sz-AVH subjects, but are also exacerbated by
the kind of IS exhibited by this population. On the one hand,
the EF difficulties experienced by Sz-AVH subjects impact their
use of IS, thereby contributing to its uncontrolled character. On
the other hand, an uncontrolled IS is likely to have important
effects on executive functioning as well. In a nutshell, underlying
EF problems result in an uncontrolled IS profile, which in turn
engenders additional issues in the executive domain.
The evidence discussed in the first part of the section points
to global EF impairments in the Sz-AVH population that are
more severe with respect to controls as well as people with
schizophrenia simpliciter. Such global EF issues are likely to
impact self-monitoring and self-control to a significant extent.
Self-monitoring is a control mechanism that enables subjects to
monitor and correct errors, and so to successfully achieve goals
and complete actions (Pacherie, 2008). While the execution of
some plans, like verbally expressing a thought or reaching for
a glass, may not engage EF components, other goals require
a hierarchical implementation that may fail if EF components
do not work properly. Specific EF impairments such as false
recognitions or intrusions in inhibition tasks (Hugdahl et al.,
2012), or the inability to filter out irrelevant items in WM (Waters
et al., 2003; Brébion et al., 2016) are thus likely to significantly
impact self-monitoring. Disruptions in self-monitoring would
result in a diminished control, which can in turn give rise to
experiences of alienation in extreme cases (i.e., complete lack of
control). In fact, many researchers have suggested that passivity
phenomena in schizophrenia relate to failures in self-monitoring
(Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992), and in particular that AVH are
the result of failures in monitoring mechanisms applied to IS
production (Frith, 1992; Langland-Hassan, 2008; Vicente, 2014).
Such issues with self-monitoring at the level of implementing
basic goals will also carry over to higher order plans that recruit
EF components that are themselves compromised. In particular,
they may affect what has been labeled “dialogic IS” (Fernyhough,
2004), which refers to the conversations we have with ourselves
(see below). In this respect, the overflowing and distracting
nature of IS in Sz-AVH (i.e., the impossibility to keep it focused
on some goal), due to self-monitoring issues, may ultimately
relate to inhibition and WM difficulties. Indeed, a subject’s
inability to inhibit prepotent responses, filter out distractors,
keep in mind the relevant aspects of a task, and selectively focus
attention on them may generate more intrusions in IS, thereby
making it more uncontrolled.
We then suggest that some further EF issues would appear as
a consequence of such uncontrolled IS profile. That is, Sz-AVH
subjects may have a harder time employing their IS effectively
and channeling it toward the task at hand. For instance, going
back to the features listed above, we suggest that evaluative
and motivational aspects of IS are likely to have an impact
on EF tasks, as a negative, emotionally relevant, and dystonic
background commentary on one’s performance is likely to be
particularly disruptive. Similarly, fragmentation and multiplicity
in IS would make it difficult for subjects to employ IS for
self-direction and self-regulation purposes, as their experience
would be harder to integrate and unify under a stable point of
view. IS experiences characterized by multiplicity would thus
prevent subjects from focusing on the task at hand, as several
aspects of reality present themselves as relevant at the same time.
So, the use of IS in Sz-AVH subjects would create additional
difficulties in EF tasks, and specifically in those tasks where
IS is said to be helpful in the neurotypical population. If a
subject experiences one’s own IS as being uncontrolled, negative,
and fragmented, all the Core EF are likely to suffer: such a
profile arguably makes it harder to manipulate information
online (WM), to suppress irrelevant responses (inhibition), and
to flexibly transition between different aspects of a given task
(switching). HO-EF such as planning, reasoning, or problem-
solving, usually considered to significantly engage IS, would be
negatively affected too.
In the particular case of AVH, there is evidence supporting
the idea that AVH experiences would negatively affect EF
performance by attracting attentional focus and thereby
impairing cognitive control, in particular inhibition. For
instance, Hugdahl et al. (2012) ran a dichotic listening task on a
sample of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Within these
tasks, subjects are asked to attend to external speech sounds
coming from their left and right. Given the already known Right
Ear Advantage phenomenon (REA), the request to focus on
the right ear is usually taken to measure attentional focus (FR,
synergic action), whereas the request to focus on the left ear helps
to measure control or inhibition (FL, antagonistic action). The
results collected by Hugdahl et al. (2012) support the idea that
Sz-AVH subjects would experience more “voice interference,”
and the effect would be particularly strong given that the task
employs a similar sensory modality (i.e., acoustically presented
speech sound). Notably, this effect appears to correlate with AVH
severity: “The more frequent the hallucinations, the less were
these patients able to direct attention to the right ear syllable
in the FR instruction condition, and to use cognitive control to
increase reporting of the left ear syllable in the FL instruction
condition” (p. 304).
To enhance self-regulation, IS has to resemble a well-
structured conversation as much as possible. The Vygotskyan
hypothesis is that children internalize patterns of conversation
that have proven useful in regulating their behavior (e.g.,
directing their attention to relevant features of the environment,
sequencing their behavior in a certain way, alerting them about
switching, etc.). In order to be a tool for self-regulation, IS should
thus resemble that kind of regulatory conversation. Now, imagine
a caregiver playing with a child trying to solve a jigsaw puzzle
who instead of telling the kid “this piece here,” “look there,”
etc., starts speaking about a movie, then lunch, then how ugly
the puzzle is, etc. Instead of regulating the child’s behavior, the
caregiver will only be distracting the child and interfering with
her performance, even more so if the caregiver’s talk is loaded
with negative evaluations. Similarly, there is no reason why
talking to ourselves should not be a distractor rather than a useful
resource. In order to be a useful resource IS has to be itself under
control. After all, speaking to oneself in silence is an action that
usually forms part of a larger plan of actions; as such it has to be
monitored so that it adjusts to the goals of the plan, and corrected
if it does not. A controlled form of IS will be structured in the way
overt conversations are structured, i.e., around a question under
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discussion (or QUD, see Roberts, 1996). A less controlled IS
will not respect the QUD dynamics, and subjects will experience
a less robust feeling of agency concerning their IS, since their
self-talk will switch from one question to another without really
addressing any of them, that is, without achieving the goal of
opening a conversation. In such cases, subjects will experience
their IS as being intrusive. This might be seen as the result of
multiplicity and fragmentation within IS. Less controlled forms
of IS may result in contents that are themselves disruptive (i.e.,
independently of not being part of a conversation). Instances
of disruptive content would feature prominently in negative
or evaluative IS experiences (e.g., self-derogatory talk). In the
extreme case of AVH, IS will be misattributed and experienced
as alien. If this is correct, uncontrolled IS may therefore become
disruptive when it comes to EF tasks, which by definition require
the subject to focus on relevant stimuli and filter out non-
relevant ones.
We realize that the view we defend could raise a potential
circularity worry: after all, impaired EF would be responsible for
uncontrolled IS, and at the same time uncontrolled IS would
cause problems in EF tasks. To clarify: our point is that some
EF impairments are not caused by uncontrolled forms of IS but
they are instead, together with self-monitoring issues, what causes
unregulated IS. However, if IS is uncontrolled, insofar as it is
usually recruited in EF tasks, it will generate further EF problems.
In order for IS to be of any use (with respect to EF), subjects
need to already possess a minimally functioning EF system that
inhibits, updates, etc., and is eventually capable of controlling
IS. Otherwise, IS per se is of no help, or, even worse, it can be
disruptive. To sum up: we do not claim that all EF problems in
Sz-AVH subjects stem from uncontrolled IS. Rather, the claim is
that, to the extent that EF tasks tend to recruit IS, an uncontrolled
and distracting IS will have a negative impact in such tasks.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION AND INNER
SPEECH IN ASC
Autistic Spectrum Condition (ASC) is a neurodevelopmental
condition defined by deficits in social communication and
interaction and restrictive and repetitive patterns of behavior
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). In this section
we first review some existing findings on how ASC subjects
perform in EF tasks, and then we connect these results with our
broader hypothesis concerning the use of IS in this population.
Several studies show that EF impairments are prevalent in
Autistic Spectrum Conditions. Such results led to the formulation
of the theory of ASC as deficits in executive functioning (Ozonoff
et al., 1991; Hughes et al., 1994; Hill, 2004). The executive
dysfunction theory was taken to account for many of the non-
social aspects of autism and was the only theory acknowledging
both the cognitive and motor aspects of ASC (Rajendran and
Mitchell, 2007), compared with the Theory of Mind theory
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and the Weak Central Coherence
theory (Frith, 1989). This theory also purported to account for
theory of mind deficits within ASC, as EF difficulties would make
it harder for a subject to simultaneously hold two representations
in mind, i.e., one about reality and the other about the other
person’s representation of reality. Overall, a recent meta-analysis
of EF in ASC confirms a broad executive dysfunction (Demetriou
et al., 2018), although EF deficits are not currently regarded as
core symptoms of ASC (Friedman and Sterling, 2019).
Empirical studies show that evidence is mixed and EF
performance in autism depends on a number of factors, including
the function evaluated, the population of the studies, the subtypes
of autism, etc. Regarding working memory, some studies found
significant working memory impairments in ASC (Boucher et al.,
2012; Kercood et al., 2014) and WM impairments have been
reported to be related to communication and socialization deficits
(Gilotty et al., 2002; Oliveras-Rentas et al., 2012) and restrictive
and repetitive behaviors (Lopez et al., 2005; Sachse et al., 2013) in
individuals with ASC. This general view, however, receives a more
detailed treatment when studies look for differences between
verbal and visuospatial working memory, the results then being
that visuospatial working memory is more impaired than verbal
working memory (Kercood et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017) or even
that verbal WM is intact (Williams et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2010).
This is relevant to our purpose of investigating the presence
and use of IS in the ASC population. Notably, in the studies
conducted by Williams and colleagues, performance both among
controls and ASC people in WM tasks have been found to decline
substantially when IS use is obstructed through articulatory
suppression (Williams et al., 2008 for evidence about children;
Williams et al., 2012 for evidence about adults). This already
indicates that some use of IS is in place in ASC populations and
that it seems to play a central role in recalling tasks.
With respect to inhibition, studies with ASC people show
general patterns of deficits of inhibitory control (Geurts et al.,
2014), also associated with restricted and repetitive behaviors
(South et al., 2007; Mosconi et al., 2009). Xiao et al. (2012)
also show inhibitory dysfunction in high-functioning adolescents
with ASC, using the Go/no-go and the Stroop tasks using
functional imaging techniques. Similarly, Schmitt et al. (2018)
show inhibitory control deficits in ASC involving failures to
strategically delay behavioral response onset. In contrast with
this, Lopez et al. (2005) report good performance on response
inhibition (and on WM too) in adults, and Adams and Jarrold
(2012) find that children with autism have no difficulty inhibiting
prepotent responses in a stop-signal task.6
Regarding the remaining core component of EF in ASC,
task-switching, once again the evidence appears to be mixed.
Several studies have shown impairment in task-switching using
the WCST (see Willcutt et al., 2008; Landry and Al-Taie,
2016). These studies found a large effect size for the difference
in task-switching between ASC and typically developing (TD)
groups, with ASC adults scoring particularly high in terms
of perseverative errors in the card-sorting task (Lopez et al.,
2005). However, Geurts et al. (2009) claim that such tasks are
6However, they show significant inhibitory impairment on so-called “flanker”
tasks, which require the identification of a target stimulus surrounded by various
distracting stimuli (Adams and Jarrold, 2012, p. 1,053). An additional complication
in inhibition studies in the ASC population is that in many cases the comorbidity
with ADHD might be responsible for the inhibition impairments (see section
“Further Considerations” below).
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not related to task-switching per se but to the whole Core EF
construct. To rule out the competing explanations for failure
in the WCST, some researchers employ the Intra Dimensional-
Extra Dimensional shift task (ID/ED). This test is similar to the
WCST but requires participants to shift both intra-dimensionally
(e.g., between different colors) and extra-dimensionally (e.g.,
from color to shape). Evidence is mixed here, again, as Ozonoff
et al. (2004) reported difficulties with ED-shifts but not with
ID-shifts in the largest autism study to date on children (but
see Landa, 2007, for contrary evidence). Geurts et al. (2009)
argue that attention deficits can also be responsible for failures
in ED-shifts, combined with the fact that participants that do not
reach the final stages of the ID/ED task are automatically given
the highest error score. This seems to be particularly relevant
given how the task is designed, with the most difficult parts –
i.e., extra-dimensional shifts – always appearing at the end. As
a consequence, subjects who have a hard time staying focused
(no matter the reason) would inevitably score poorly. Attention
deficits have been argued to be central in autism (Allen and
Courchesne, 2001), although once again the high comorbidity
with ADHD may be a confounding factor (see section “Further
Considerations”).
Interestingly, it has been shown that ASC children show
limited use of IS in task-switching paradigms (Whitehouse et al.,
2006) and arithmetic task-switching tasks (Holland and Low,
2010), and this negatively impacts their performance. Actually,
Geurts et al. (2009) report that the task-switching performance
of ASC adults improves if they are informed that the rule has
changed. That is, ASC people can perform as well as their TD
peers in pure switching tasks (e.g., just switching from one way of
sorting cards to another) once they are explicitly told that the task
is different. This suggests that TD peers, who do not need such
an explicit reminder, may be alerting themselves about changes
in rules using their own IS (see section “IS in ASC and Sz-AVH:
How It Relates to EF” below).
Finally, experimental evidence of planning and problem-
solving abilities in ASC people point to the fact that they
encounter planning difficulties (e.g., Lopez et al., 2005 for results
on adults and Wallace et al., 2009 for results on adolescents).
They have trouble organizing their daily life, keeping up with
(social) activities or coping with unregulated stretches of time
(Ozonoff et al., 2002; American Psychiatric Association [APA],
2013). A recent quantitative meta-review (Dubbelink and Geurts,
2017) concludes that people with ASC show poorer planning
performance than TD individuals (moderate difference in size)
that is consistent across lifespan (age), various types of planning
tasks, and intellectual abilities.7 Other studies examining the
use of IS in ASC with respect to planning and problem-
solving showed that children failed to use IS in planning
movement compared to visuospatial resources (Holland and
7The tests used in the various studies include the Tower of London (Lopez et al.,
2005), the Vygotsky Blocks Test (Wallace et al., 2009), and the tasks discussed in
the meta-analysis by Dubbelink and Geurts (2017) include the Tower of Hanoi,
Tower of London, Tower of California, Zoo Map test, Key search test, Planning
drawing task, Truck loading, Stockings of Cambridge, Mazes, and Cognitive
Assessment treatment-planning.
Low, 2010), and that planning was not verbally mediated in adults
(Williams et al., 2012).
Drawing on these experimental results, we suggest that ASC
people may not capitalize on the enhancing potential that an
appropriate use of IS might have for planning and problem-
solving. However, they may perform well in certain planning
tasks that can be solved using visuospatial resources. Geurts
et al. (2009) show that inflexible everyday behavior in ASC
fails to be adequately reflected by experimental results in tasks
measuring flexibility (such as the WCST). In other words, the
clinical evidence about behavioral flexibility conflicts with the
experimental evidence about cognitive flexibility. Something
similar may apply to planning: performance in tasks such as the
Tower of London may be poor predictors of coping with real-
life planning demands, especially if such tasks allow for the use
of compensatory strategies such as visuospatial planning that
may be more difficult to implement in real-life situations. The
empirical evidence we reviewed about EF difficulties and IS use
in ASC suggest that ASC people have a diminished use of IS
compared to neurotypicals (see also Mulvihill et al., 2020 for a
recent review of self-directed speech –including IS – in children
with ASC, ADHD, and DLD). On the one hand, they exhibit
good performance in verbal WM, which is, on the face of it,
an instance of IS recruitment. But on the other hand, studies
on other core EF components such as inhibition or cognitive
flexibility, as well as higher-order ones such as planning and
problem-solving, suggest that an insufficient recruitment of IS
may be responsible for their weak performance in such domains.
The idea that ASC children would have trouble engaging in self-
instruction, and thereby in completing EF tasks, is not entirely
new (see Russell et al., 1999). This hypothesis is also congenial
to Fernyhough’s suggestion (1996; also mentioned in Williams
et al., 2012) that ASC people may have a monologic rather than
dialogic form of IS. This would not imply a complete inability to
produce IS, like the one exhibited by some people with aphasia
who are unable to judge whether two words rhyme (Geva et al.,
2011). What we suggest is rather that people with ASC would not
appropriately employ IS in the service of self-regulation and/or
thinking, that is in processes in which IS typically takes the
form of a conversation where proper speech acts are produced
(i.e., assertions, questions, commands, etc.). This would imply
that at least some EF issues in ASC are related to a diminished
recruitment or lack of use of IS.
It should be noted that ‘diminished use (or lack) of IS’ refers to
a form of IS that characterizes it as precisely a form of proper
speech, in analogy with outer speech. There is a difference in
kind between simply holding verbal information in mind (as in
WM) and engaging in self-talk for thinking and other cognitive
functions. The process of holding in mind verbal information
does not require to produce meaningful IS and not even to
perform proper speech acts. For instance, unlike typical speech
production, the former process does not begin with a “message”
to be expressed. Therefore, the crucial difference here does not
rest on the relevant process being dialogic versus monologic (as
Fernyhough, 2004 has suggested), but rather on the fact that the
self-talk for thinking is an instance of proper speech while holding
information in mind is not. The kind of IS that relates to effective
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EF in neurotypicals is what we could call “proper IS” (Martínez-
Manrique and Vicente, 2015): people give themselves verbal
instructions, focus their attention by using verbal commands,
assertions or reminders, motivate themselves using exclamatives,
etc. In general, neurotypicals use a kind of IS in the service of self-
regulation that resembles their overt speech (Martínez-Manrique
and Vicente, 2010; Jorba and Vicente, 2014). The kind of IS that is
quite consistently found lacking or diminished in ASC (Williams
et al., 2008, Williams et al., 2012) is precisely this proper form of
IS (see also Hurlburt et al., 1994).
The claim that lacking or diminished use of IS might
be responsible for EF problems encounters some exceptions,
which also end up supporting the claim. Williams et al.
(2012), point out that not recruiting IS for EF tasks (but also,
for other functions) may not be a general feature of ASC
people: in their study, adults diagnosed with ASC who had
comparatively better socio-communicative performance showed
a decline in performance for planning tasks under verbal
interference. As Alderson-Day and Fernyhough (2015) point out:
“Communication scores for ASD participants on the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000)
and Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) were observed
to predict articulatory suppression effects during planning,
suggesting a link between communicative ability and lack of
IS specifically to support problem-solving” (p. 946, emphasis
ours). The DSM-5 distinguishes two dimensions in ASC: socio-
communicative problems, and restrictive and repetitive patterns
of behavior. Similarly, the ADOS diagnostic test has separate
scores for the socio-affective dimension, and stereotypical and
repetitive behavior and fixed interests. Probably, the fewer socio-
communicative problems a person has, the more typically verbal
in general she will be (except if she has further problems with
language). And actually, ASC people with lower scores (that is,
fewer problems) in the socio-affective dimension of the ADOS
are overall more “conversational”: they keep track of the common
ground (e.g., they introduce new referents with indefinites and
not with definites or proper names); they address the question
under discussion (e.g., they observe the principle of relevance):
and they use tags and other discourse particles that engage
their interlocutor (e.g., tags like “right?”, beginnings such as
“now, look!”, expressions like “sweetie,” etc.): see Castroviejo and
Vicente (unpublished).8
So it is likely that people who have a more fluent “proper”
conversation will also recruit IS more often, and for the same
functions for which most overt speech is used (as happens
in the neurotypical population). Then the hypothesis is that
only ASC people who have fewer problems in maintaining a
conversation (and who, correspondingly, had fewer problems in
learning how to converse) will make a more or less typical use
of IS. In contrast, people who have more socio-communicative
problems will also exhibit more problems in having fluent
conversations as well as in recruiting IS in those situations where
the aid of overt speech would also be helpful. In such cases,
the increased propensity for visual over verbal encoding may
8Stronger socio-affective abilities have also been found to correlate with irony
comprehension (Spotorno and Noveck, 2014).
reflect a compensatory response to reduced verbal ability and
self-directed talk regulatory effectiveness (Lidstone et al., 2009;
Russell-Smith et al., 2014).
IS IN ASC AND Sz-AVH: HOW IT
RELATES TO EF
In the previous sections we have reviewed evidence concerning
how IS is supposed to be involved in EF tasks, and we have offered
some suggestions on the kinds of IS profiles exhibited by people
diagnosed with ASC and by Sz-AVH people. In this section we
aim at bringing together these results to offer a more coherent
picture of how different uses of IS may impact EF in these two
populations as well as in neurotypicals.
Given the evidence discussed above, IS appears to play an
important role in EF tasks. It may be questioned whether IS plays
the same role across different populations: for example, we have
seen that ASC people can perform well on planning tasks such as
the Tower of London without the aid of IS, while neurotypicals
perform worse on average if unable to use IS. This means that the
use of IS is not crucial in some EF tasks across subjects (though it
may be crucial for a subset of them). However, overall, it can be
maintained that IS enhances performance in EF tasks, even in the
“classical” experimental tasks. In Go/No-go tasks, for instance, it
helps to label the stimuli in IS (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough,
2015). As Lupyan and Bergen (2016) have stressed:
“For example, labeling one’s actions supports the integration of event
representations (Karbach et al., 2011), overt self-directed speech
can improve performance on such tasks as visual search by helping
to activate visual properties of the targets (Lupyan and Swingley,
2012). Conversely, interfering with (covert) verbalization impairs
the ability to flexibly switch from one task to another (Baddeley
et al., 2001; Emerson and Miyake, 2003), hinting that normal
task-switching performance is aided by such self-directed, covert
instruction.” (p. 410).
But even in those tasks where the use of IS has not been
directly tested, it can be argued that the recruitment of IS
improves performance. A case in point is, again, task-switching.
As noted above, Geurts et al. (2009) report that the performance
of ASC subjects in the WCST improves when they are informed
that the rule has changed. This is presumably so because by telling
ourselves that the rule has changed, or which is the new rule,
this information is thereby made conscious, that is, we become
aware of something we were not aware of before and so we can
act upon it. There is also some evidence that communicative
acts like this also help neurotypicals in very different tasks, from
reorienting themselves (Shusterman et al., 2011) to encoding
spatial relationships (Landau et al., 2010).
Spelke’s reorientation data were widely discussed in the
early 2000s: after being disoriented in a room with three
white walls and a fourth red wall of different sizes, subjects
experienced reorientation problems under verbal interference.
Shusterman et al. (2011) later observed that reorientation
was significantly improved if 4-year-olds, who had the same
reorientation problems as adults under verbal interference, were
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 572035
fpsyg-11-572035 September 15, 2020 Time: 19:14 # 10
Petrolini et al. Inner Speech in Executive Functioning Tasks
told at the beginning of the test that the object they had to look
for (i.e., a sticker) was “hidden at the red/white wall.” Non-
spatial but task-relevant expressions – such as “The red/white
wall can help you get the sticker” – also enhanced children’s
search. A likely reading of these results is that adults have
to be able to verbally remind themselves where the hidden
object is, something they cannot accomplish as effectively under
verbal interference. Similarly, in Shusterman et al. (2011) study
children’s performance improves exactly when these verbal
reminders are made more explicit. In other words, orientation
is improved if subjects are able to use IS. Landau et al. (2010),
on the other hand, presented findings on how language can
enrich how we represent a scene (so that we can later on
recall more details of it). Their results are best interpreted if we
think about language as a means of directing attention, as the
linguistic input helps hearers focus their attention on aspects
of the scene that they would have not otherwise encoded. For
instance, we may watch a square divided in two halves by a
vertical line, the right part green, the left part red. When, after
a brief exposure, we have to pick out the square from a set
of four pictures with different distributions of green and red,
we have real problems to retrieve the correct distribution of
colors. We know the colors are green and red, but do not know
where they go: we do not bind colors to the left and right
parts of the square. Landau et al. (2010) tested whether such
binding could be improved through language. They tested 4-
year-olds in several conditions: experimenters labeled the whole
square (“this is a dax”), or they said “the red is touching the
green,” or they drew the children’s attention to the red part
(“look at the red!”), or, finally, they directly told them: “the
red is on the left.” Children improved over the no-stimulus
condition only in the last of these conditions. According to
Landau et al. (2010), once children’s attention is directed toward
the relation between the two colors, they are able to solve
the binding problem. Again, a case can be made for thinking
that adults who succeed in these tasks do so because they
are telling themselves what the experimenter says aloud to
the 4-year-olds.
Notably, these are not issues about preferences in task
performance, i.e., whether some subjects prefer to solve the
task using language while others prefer imagistic thinking. It
is rather an issue about the intrinsic limitations in terms of
attentional resources that visualizations may have as opposed
to linguistic encodings. In other tasks the use of IS may even
be detrimental, as showcased by the “verbal overshadowing
effect” (Chin and Schooler, 2008).9 But, generally speaking,
9Verbal overshadowing occurs when verbalizing mental contents deteriorates the
performance of a task in which those contents appear to be involved. For instance,
in a classical experimental setting, all subjects watch a video about a certain salient
individual that they will have to identify afterward. After watching the film and
before testing their identification capacity, some subjects had to verbally describe
the target individual while others had to read an unrelated text for the same
amount of time. The results show that the subsequent performance in recognizing
the individual (e.g., picking him/her out of a line-up) was poorer for those subjects
that had been asked to describe the individual. The phenomenon is robust in the
domain of face recognition – where it was originally demonstrated– but Chin and
Schooler (2008) report that it has been observed also in decision making, problem
solving, analogical reasoning, and visual imagery.
IS simplifies EF tasks and so solving such tasks without IS
will at least increase one’s cognitive load. The point made by
Geurts et al. (2009) about the improvement observed in the
WCST after communicating that the rule had changed seems
to tell us something similar. In these cases, there may be
problems attending to failed responses properly, or realizing
that one has made enough mistakes before trying another
rule, or there might be problems inhibiting a preponderant
response. Whatever the reason for not switching in time, being
told “this is a new rule” obviously reduces cognitive load. It
simplifies the task in a similar way as being told “the red is
on the left” simplifies Landau et al. (2010)’s task. If subjects tell
themselves things such as “same rule,” or “new rule,” at each
trial, they will be able to simplify the task considerably. For
instance, hearing themselves say “same rule” after a mistake
will alert them about an inconsistency that prompts them to
look for a new rule. Such linguistic encoding of the input
increases vigilance at very low cost. A similar process has been
detected by researchers studying task-switching in subjects with
schizophrenia. Indeed, some studies suggest that participants
with schizophrenia improve their performance in EF tasks when
they are explicitly asked to verbalize their thought processes.
For instance, Perry et al. (2001) ran the WCST with a group
of schizophrenic subjects, and reported that their performance
significantly improved when they were asked to verbalize their
current sorting category for each card. These results suggest that
verbalizing (either overtly or covertly) might be an important
component of successful performance even on seemingly non-
verbal tasks such as the WCST.
Verbalization, be it overt or inner, thus improves EF
performance in probably all the EF-subcomponents, which
means that subjects who would normally fail to recruit IS
altogether (ASC) as well as subjects who lack control over
their IS (Sz-AVH) face clear EF disadvantages. In terms of
intervention, both kinds of populations could be encouraged
to mobilize IS as a tool in service of these tasks. On the one
hand, people with ASC benefit from more explicit instructions
- such as being told that the rule has changed – because it
facilitates holding and manipulating information in WM, and
reduces cognitive load with respect to switching and planning.
Intervention in ASC should therefore strive at making subjects
more likely to use IS. On the other hand, Sz-AVH people benefit
from a guided and explicit verbalization because it filters out
possible distractors and keeps people focused on the task at
hand. Intervention in this case should aim at keeping IS under
control, so that subjects themselves are able to channel it toward
the task at stake.
At the same time it is important to stress the alternative
strategies used by ASC people to bypass the failure to recruit
IS. ASC people are able to compensate for a diminished use of
IS in EF tasks by using visuospatial formats, and this seems to
be a strength in the ASC population across the board (Morsanyi
et al., 2019). However, according to the literature reviewed above,
visuospatial formats also have intrinsic limits. Without having
to endorse views such as Bermudez’s (2003) or Gauker’s (2011),
which deny that imagistic formats are able to be the basis of
propositional thinking, it seems to be the case that language
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considerably simplifies EF tasks. If this is correct, compensatory
mechanisms will be far from perfect substitutes to the use of
language, but they would still be able to compensate to an extent.
However, with respect to AVH and similar profiles characterized
by uncontrolled and intrusive IS, intervention on IS seems more
pressing, given the lack of any compensatory mechanism. In
other words: if you have an overly active IS, your performance
in EF tasks will inevitably decline because of interference and
distraction, that is, unless you are able to gain control over it.
However, if you do not use IS for these tasks, you have more
wiggle room to employ alternative strategies, e.g., visual or spatial,
and thus perform better.
We have mainly discussed ASC and Sz-AVH because they
illustrate two different ways in which issues about IS can affect
EF. This comparison should not overlook the fact that these two
conditions have a different relationship to IS overall. Whereas Sz-
AVH is mainly described as an IS disturbance, the diminished
role of IS in ASC is not key to ASC as a condition per se, but
probably originates from socio-communicative developmental
trajectories. However, the more substantial difference between
the two conditions is the following: in Sz-AVH IS is (too)
active and uncontrolled due to pre-existing EF issues, whereas
in ASC IS does not appear as active as in the TD population
and this leads to diminished EF performance. We have suggested
that these differences in EF profiles are due to the IS profiles
that each population presents. An uncontrolled form of IS
in Sz-AVH leads to important EF issues, and diminished use
or lack of use of IS in ASC possibly leads to EF difficulties
in ASC. Overall, we think that the focus on these two
populations and the hypothesis advanced shed some light on
both conditions and more generally on the role played by IS in
clinical and non-clinical populations, thus paving the way for
further exploration.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
There are a few issues that we should flag before we conclude.
One important limitation in our discussion of ASC concerns the
fact that potentially confounding factors, such as IQ or verbal
competency, are not ruled out by many of the studies we examine.
To address such important worries, future studies investigating
the role of IS in ASC EF-profiles should carefully control for these
variables. The same is true about the high comorbidity between
ASC and ADHD, given that most studies on ASC do not directly
control for it (but see Sinzig et al., 2008).10 As a result, in many
cases it is difficult to establish whether EF difficulties are ASC-
specific, or whether they actually result from the simultaneous
presence of ADHD in a majority of subjects.
Our hypothesis would probably be enriched by analyzing the
role of IS specifically in ADHD. Although it is a less researched
area, there is some evidence pointing toward dysfunctions in
self-regulation and delay in the internalization from overt
to covert speech, with potentially important implications on
10In this study, ASC children with ADHD comorbidity show difficulties with
a battery of EF tasks, whereas ASC children without such comorbidity do not.
However, other studies failed to find such differences (see Corbett et al., 2009).
EF. For instance, Barkley (1997) suggests that a delay of
self-directed speech (SDS) internalization negatively impacts
its guiding function that he describes as fundamental to self-
control, problem solving, moral reasoning, and metacognition.
More recent studies support the idea of a delayed progression
from overt to internalized SDS, as well as the preponderance
of task-irrelevant content. Although such delay could be
responsible for some EF dysfunctions, the evidence is still far
from conclusive and the interpretations regarding the self-
regulatory efficacy of SDS in ADHD are somewhat speculative
(Mulvihill et al., 2020). That said, some encouraging results
may be gleaned from some successful academic interventions
on students with ADHD. As reported by Miranda et al. (2009),
one of the cognitive-behavioral techniques that has shown
the greatest efficacy employs self-instruction (i.e., self-talk)
to foster sequential thinking, facilitate the comprehension of
situations, spontaneously generate strategies and mediators, and
use these mediators to guide and control behavior (Meichenbaum
and Goodman, 1971). Other successful programs, such as
“Thinking aloud” (Bash and Camp, 1980) and “Stop and
think” (Kendall et al., 1980), similarly encourage the use of
self-instructional techniques to support problem-solving and
contingency management.
It is likely that the delay in the use of IS in ADHD relates
to lack of attention in regulatory practices. If the child fails to
be regulated by the overt speech of her caregivers, she will also
fail to internalize this kind of speech efficiently. On the other
hand, it is also probable that, like in Sz-AVH, IS is not adequately
controlled in ADHD, thereby becoming more a distractor than
an aid. Thus, the abovementioned interventions can be seen as
aiming in good part at structuring subjects’ self-talk. If this is
correct, the IS profile in ADHD would be significantly different
from the ASC profile. In ADHD, there would be core EF deficits
that affect their use of IS, resulting in an inefficient IS, i.e., an IS
that cannot be used for improving EF. By contrast, in ASC there
would be no such deficits, as the attested deficits in EF would
simply be the result of not recruiting IS often enough, i.e., not
recruiting a tool that can enhance EF.
Another confounding factor in studies about IS in ASC
is language delay and ASC + DLD (developmental language
disorders) comorbidity. In Section “Executive Function and Inner
Speech in ASC,” we have discussed studies that prima facie show
a diminished use of IS in EF tasks in the ASC profile, such as
the one conducted by Williams et al. (2012). Other studies and
pieces of evidence report a generally diminished use of IS in ASC.
For example, Hurlburt et al. (1994), using Hurlburt’s Descriptive
Sampling Method (DES), examined inner experiences in the daily
life of three Asperger people, finding no use of IS. Also, first-
person accounts such as, famously, Temple Grandin’s memoir
(Grandin, 1995) have made popular the idea that Asperger people
may not recruit IS at all. However, not all the results showing
diminished use of IS in ASC are equally compelling, for they
precisely investigate the ASC + DLD profile without controlling
for such comorbidity.
Language acquisition delay is widespread in ASC (although
not as much in the Asperger profile), and there is a growing
consensus that ASC+DLD comorbidity is indeed quite frequent
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 572035
fpsyg-11-572035 September 15, 2020 Time: 19:14 # 12
Petrolini et al. Inner Speech in Executive Functioning Tasks
(Tager-Flusberg, 2000). Studies that work with ASC people who
have some deficits in structural language, and which show that
such people do not recruit IS as often as neurotypicals, do not
show that IS is differently recruited in the ASC profile as such.
It is predictable that people who have some kind of problem or
delay with language competence more generally will have issues
with IS. For instance, a study by Campbell et al. (2017) reports
a lack of recruitment of IS in ASC in task-switching tasks. They
suggest that visual abilities may play a unique role in the ASC
population as they seem to capitalize on them given their “weak
verbal abilities.” However, these results are not illustrative about
the use of IS in ASC. Studies on DLD also connect delayed
language development with scarcer IS presence. Overall, it seems
that children with DLD use self-directed talk to a lesser extent
than TD peers, with a negative impact on tasks such as the Tower
of London (Lidstone et al., 2012). Therefore, it is likely that the
above results have more to do with linguistic problems than with
the autistic condition.
Reviewing studies on DLD, IS, and EF is beyond the scope of
this paper, although it is predictable that children with DLD will
also show a diminished use of IS. A point for further exploration
concerns the role of IS in EF tasks in DLD, ADHD, as well as
in other conditions such as depression, anxiety, and obsessive-
compulsive disorders, where there is already research on IS
behavior (Harrington and Blankenship, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2004; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014; Nalborczyk et al.,
2017). Besides shedding some light on how different IS profiles
may impact EF in the ASC and AVH populations, we hope that
the dimensions of IS that we have uncovered would prove helpful
in investigating these and other clinical conditions.
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